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ABSTRACT
Detecting spoofed utterances is a fundamental problem in
voice-based biometrics. Spoofing can be performed either
by logical accesses like speech synthesis, voice conversion
or by physical accesses such as replaying the pre-recorded
utterance. Inspired by the state-of-the-art x-vector based
speaker verification approach, this paper proposes a time-
delay shallow neural network (TD-SNN) for spoof detection
for both logical and physical access. The novelty of the pro-
posed TD-SNN system vis-a-vis conventional DNN systems
is that it can handle variable length utterances during testing.
Performance of the proposed TD-SNN systems and the base-
line Gaussian mixture models (GMMs) is analyzed on the
ASV-spoof-2019 dataset. The performance of the systems is
measured in terms of the minimum normalized tandem detec-
tion cost function (min-t-DCF). When studied with individual
features, the TD-SNN system consistently outperforms the
GMM system for physical access. For logical access, GMM
surpasses TD-SNN systems for certain individual features.
When combined with the decision-level feature switching
(DLFS) paradigm, the best TD-SNN system outperforms the
best baseline GMM system on evaluation data with a relative
improvement of 48.03% and 49.47% for both logical and
physical access, respectively.
Index Terms: anti-spoofing, voice-biometrics, GMM, x-
vectors, time-delay neural networks
1. INTRODUCTION
Although automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems are
robust to impostor threats [1] and acoustic variations, they are
vulnerable when subjected to presentation attacks. Present-
ing a fake biometric sample to a biometric detection system
is referred to as a presentation attack1. The process of this
deliberate evasion is called spoofing. Spoofing at sample ac-
quisition stage can be classified into two categories, namely,
logical access (LA) and physical access (PA) [2]. Spoofing
We would like to thank the ASV-Spoof-2019 organizers for providing
the new spoof detection dataset.
1https://www.iso.org/standard/53227.html
samples generated using speech synthesis (SS) or voice con-
version (VC) approach are categorized as LA while replay-
ing a pre-recorded original audio falls under the PA category.
The primary objective of ASV-spoof-challenge proposed in
2015 was to detect LA. Since the implementation of PA is
easier than LA, the former attack is a greater threat than later.
ASV-spoof-challenge in 2017 focused on identifying physi-
cal access. Numerous spoof detection algorithms have been
proposed since then for both LA [3–5] and PA [6–8].
ASV-spoof-2019 challenge focused on detecting spoofed
utterances synthesized by both LA and PA. Unlike the pre-
vious anti-spoofing challenges, equal error rate (EER) was
not used as the evaluation metric due to its ill-suited oper-
ating point for user applications like telephone banking [9].
Hence a new metric termed as a minimum normalized tan-
dem detection cost function (min-t-DCF) is provided as the
evaluation metric. The min-t-DCF considers the false alarms
and misses for both countermeasure system as well as the au-
tomatic speaker verification (ASV) system, along with the
prior probabilities of target and spoof trials. The details of
min-t-DCF is discussed in [9, 10]. Scores from a x-vector
based speaker verification system [11] are used along with
the statistics of the spoof detection system to estimate min-t-
DCF. x-vector is a DNN based state-of-the-art speaker veri-
fication technique that embeds the speaker characteristics in
low-dimensional fixed-length vectors from variable length ut-
terances.
In this paper, inspired by the x-vector based ASV system,
we propose a similar spoof detection system for identifying
both logical and physical access. For detecting spoofed ut-
terances, the following changes are made to the time-delay
neural network architecture (x-vector) proposed in [11]: (i)
The last layer in the ASV system’s architecture is modified
to handle the two-class problem of spoof detection. (ii) In-
stead of the standard cross-entropy loss function, a new fo-
cal loss function [12] is used to give more focus on hard and
misclassified examples (iii) The network was made shallow
since this is binary classification problem with limited data.
The proposed network outperforms the baseline GMM clas-
sifier for physical access almost in all the cases. On the other
hand, the proposed system is not consistently outperforming
the GMM classifier while detecting logical access. Instead
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of conventional score fusion, decision-level feature switching
(DLFS) system proposed for ASV-spoof-2017 dataset [8] is
used to exploit the property of different features in capturing
different kinds of spoofing conditions. The focus of this paper
is three-fold: Firstly, a comparison of baseline GMM system
using four different features on ASV-spoof-2019 challenge is
discussed. Secondly, we propose a novel neural network ar-
chitecture for spoof detection system inspired by state-of-the-
art ASV system (x-vector [11]). Finally, by using DLFS on
individual feature system, the performance of spoof detection
systems (SDS) is further improved.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
discusses the details of spoof detection approaches in the liter-
ature. A brief description of ASV-spoof-2019 dataset is given
in Section 3. Section 4 gives a brief overview of the x-vector
based ASV system. The proposed architecture for spoof de-
tection is explained in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the de-
tails of baseline GMM systems, the proposed systems, and
the DLFS systems. A comprehensive analysis on the perfor-
mance of various systems is given in Section 7 followed by
the conclusion in Section 8.
2. PRIORWORKS ON SPOOF DETECTION
The ASV-spoof-2015 challenge targeted ten different types of
logical access [13]. A combination of auditory transformation
based on cochlear filter cepstral coefficients (CFCC) and in-
stantaneous frequency (IF) termed as CFCCIF is proposed as
the best feature to detect these LAs in [5]. Score fusion of
CFCCIF and MFCC was adjudged as the best system with an
average EER of 1.2% across all the ten conditions. Various
LA spoof detection systems submitted to the challenge are
detailed in [4].
The speech corpus used in ASV-spoof-2017 challenge has
the spoofed instances generated by recording and replaying
the bonafide trials of speakers in different environments (E)
using various recording (R) and playback devices (P). Phys-
ical attack is harder than logical access as the spoofed utter-
ance of a bonafide trial may come from various E-R-P combi-
nations. The evaluation subset of the ASV-spoof-2017 dataset
tried to simulate this ‘in-wild’ condition by generating the
spoofed instances from different E-R-P combinations. A light
convolutional neural network (LCNN) [14] system outper-
formed all other systems submitted to the challenge. In [7]
an end-to-end neural network (NN) with attention masking
was proposed to learn the difference in the spectrogram of
bonafide and the replayed utterances. This end-to-end atten-
tion masking system pre-trained on ImageNet dataset [15]
gives an ideal performance with zero percent EER. DLFS
paradigm proposed in [8], uses information from multiple
feature spaces. This technique outperforms all other replay
attack detection systems in the literature except the ideal NN
system with zero percent EER.
Many recent works on ASV-spoof-2019 dataset uses vari-
ous end-to-end neural network (NN) structures like DNN with
nine layers [16], variations of ResNet [17], namely, Squeeze-
network (SENet), dilated ResNet, and light convolution neu-
ral network (LCNN) [18]. The NN architectures used in these
works are deep NNs with a minimum of seven layers exclud-
ing the input, pooling, and output layers. The SENet architec-
ture in [17] uses four blocks of NN architecture with several
layers of CNN/RNN in each block.
3. DATASET DESCRIPTION
Similar to the ASV-spoof-2015 and ASV-spoof-2017 cor-
pus, [19] ASV-spoof-2019 also has three subsets namely,
training (train), development (dev), and evaluation (eval).
Different subsets of data are used for LA and PA attacks.
The duration of each utterance is approximately two seconds.
Unlike the “in-wild” spoofed trials of the ASV-spoof-2017
corpus, in this dataset, the spoofed trials for physical access
are generated in controlled acoustic conditions [20]. The
latest best performing text-to-speech synthesis and voice con-
version algorithms are used to generate the spoofed trials for
logical access category. These algorithms are better than the
algorithms used in ASV-spoof-2015. The number of trials
in each subset is listed in the Table 1. The number of trials
in evaluation subsets of LA and PA are 71,747 and 137,457,
respectively.
Table 1: Number of trials in development and training subsets
Attack Subsets No. of speakers No. of trials
Male Female Bonafide Spoofed
LA
train 8 12 2580 22800
dev 8 12 2548 22296
eval - - 7355 63822
PA
train 8 12 5400 48600
dev 8 12 5400 24300
eval - - 18090 116640
4. X-VECTORS IN SPEAKER RECOGNITION
i-vectors were the state-of-the-approach for text-independent
speaker recognition since 2010 [21]. An alternate approach
proposed in [22] extracts DNN embeddings termed as x-
vectors from a NN using a temporal pooling layer. This
pooling layer facilitates the NN to discriminate the speakers
from variable-length input speech segments. During testing,
the fixed dimensional x-vectors are extracted and are com-
pared with the training data embeddings using some scoring
approach.
Speaker embeddings are extracted in [22] from variable
length acoustic segments using a DNN with a multi-class
cross-entropy loss function. The DNN consists of few time-
delay neural network (TDNN) layers to enhance frame-level
representation. A pooling layer aggregates the frame-level
representations, followed by few additional layers to handle
segment-level representations. Finally, a softmax layer is
used to get posterior probabilities of each speaker. This ap-
proach mainly aims (i) to produce the speaker embeddings at
utterance level rather than frame level and (ii) to generalize
well, to handle the unseen speakers. The main advantage
of this x-vector architecture is to handle the short duration
utterances. x-vector results in [22] are shown to outperform
the i-vector systems for short utterances of duration less than
10 seconds.
5. TD-SNN FOR SPOOF DETECTION
Generally, speaker information is present throughout the
utterance. Inspired by this concept, x-vector architecture
was proposed for automatic speaker recognition in [11, 22].
The x-vector embeddings are obtained by averaging various
statistics across time in a high-dimensional space. Similar
to the speaker characteristics, the impact of various spoof-
ing approaches used to generate the spoofed trials will be
present throughout the utterance. X-vector proposed for
ASV [11, 22], is trained using the speaker labels to extract
the speaker embeddings from the data. In this work, we show
that the same x-vector model can be used for spoof detec-
tion by training the NN using the class labels (bonafide and
spoofed) rather than the speaker labels. The results show
that the model in fact captures the characteristics of spoofing
approaches embedded in the spoofed utterances.
x-vector proposed for ASV in [22] uses eight hidden lay-
ers. Unlike ASV x-vector architecture and few other neural
network architectures for spoof detection [17, 18, 23, 24], we
propose a time-delay shallow neural network with just four
hidden layers, which includes two hidden layers at frame-
level, a pooling layer to aggregate the statistics at the utter-
ance level, and a penultimate layer to reduce the dimension.
Time-delay neural network is used for the first time to detect
the spoofing attacks.
The proposed architecture for spoof detection is shown
in Figure 1. This architecture is referred to as time-delay
shallow neural network (TD-SNN) in rest of this paper. The
first two layers are frame-level layers and use time-delay
neural networks. These layers convert the input feature vec-
tors into high-dimensional vectors by preserving temporal
information. The third layer averages information across
time by estimating mean and standard deviation, thereby
converting the inputs of variable length into a fixed length,
high-dimensional vector. The fourth hidden layer reduces this
high-dimensional vector to a low-dimensional representation.
Since spoof detection is a binary classification problem, a
soft-max layer with two outputs is used as the last layer,
to get the classification posteriors of a trial. These poste-
rior values are used to classify the trials either as bonafide
or spoofed. The embeddings extracted from the penultimate
layer can also be used to identify the spoofed utterances using
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Fig. 1: TD-SNN architecture for spoof detection
a back-end classifier.
Instead of the standard cross-entropy error, the focal loss
function is used in this work. Focal loss was first proposed
for object detection task in [12]. The focal loss reshapes
the cross-entropy loss such that it gives more importance for
hard-to-classify and misclassified examples. The focal loss is
a better loss function for the class imbalance problem (Refer
to the Table 1 for imbalance in the dataset). The focal loss is
estimated as shown in Equation 1.
F(p,y)=−α[y (1−p)γ log(p) + (1−y) (p)γ log(p)] (1)
In Equation 1, y is the ground truth class label, and p is
the posterior probability given by a neural network. α and γ
are hyper-parameters in this loss function. Setting γ to zero
reduces focal loss to the standard cross-entropy loss. In Fig-
ure 2, the 2D representation of DNN embeddings obtained
from the proposed network trained using the cross-entropy
loss and the focal loss are compared. DNN embeddings are
converted to 2D space using t-Distributed Stochastic Neigh-
bor Embedding (t-SNE) algorithm [25]. It can be observed
that focal loss produces better embeddings with lesser inter-
class overlap than the standard cross-entropy error.
In ASV, the x-vector architecture uses the raw filter bank
energies as the input. Borrowing from the ASV approaches,
the same filter bank energies were given as input to the TD-
SNN framework. As the performance was poor, the focus is
shifted to use different features for building a better classifier.
6. SPOOF DETECTION SYSTEMS (SDS)
Several attempts have been made to train an efficient classifier
for spoof detection. The most common classifiers used for
the purpose are GMMs and DNNs. Although there are few
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Fig. 2: Comparison of proposed network embeddings trained using cross-
entropy loss and focal loss. The LA development subset of ASV-spoof-2019
dataset is used to generate this plot.
Table 2: List of developed systems.
Type System System Name
GMM TD-SNN
Single Baseline
G-CQCC x-CQCC
G-LFCC x-LFCC
G-IMFCC x-IMFCC
G-LFBE x-LFBE
DLFS
Primary G-Prim x-Prim
Contrastive-1 G-C1 x-C1
Contrastive-2 G-C2 x-C2
DLFS1 G-DLFS1 x-DLFS1
DLFS2 G-DLFS2 x-DLFS2
The systems submitted to ASV-spoof-2019 challenge are
highlighted in grey color.
works with SVMs [26] and i-vectors [27], the performance
is worse than that of the GMM and DNN classifiers. Hence
in this work, we use both GMM and TD-SNN classifiers to
detect spoofed trials. GMM-based systems with a set of fea-
tures were explored, and best performing four systems were
submitted to the ASV-spoof-2019 challenge. The TD-SNN
systems were developed post-challenge. The performance of
the TD-SNN systems is compared with the submitted GMM-
based SDS using both development and evaluation data.
6.1. Single feature systems
GMM classifier has been the baseline system for all the ASV
spoof challenges conducted from 2015 to 2019. Bonafide and
spoofed trials from the training subset are used to train two
GMMs, one for the bonafide (λB) and other for the spoofed
class (λS). During testing, a trial t is given to λB and λS , and
the log-likelihood (Λ) difference is computed as
S(t) = Λ(λB(t))− Λ(λS(t)) (2)
The log-likelihood difference is considered as the final score
for the trial t. This simple classifier gave an EER of 1.44%
and 7.82% on the evaluation data of ASV-spoof-2015 [5] and
ASV-spoof-2017 [8] respectively. GMM-SDS with a set of
cepstral coefficients and filterbank energies were explored
for the ASV-spoof-2019 challenge. The GMM systems with
constant-Q cepstral coefficients (CQCC) [28, 29], inverse
Mel frequency cepstral coefficients (IMFCC) [30], linear
frequency cepstral coefficients (LFCC) [31], and linear filter-
bank energy (LFBE) gave better performance than few other
features like Mel frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC),
inverse Mel filterbank energies (IMFBE), and Mel filterbank
energies (MFBE). To compare the performance of TD-SNN
systems with that of the baseline GMM systems, TD-SNN
systems were also developed with the same set of features.
6.2. Feature switching systems
Almost every spoof detection system uses a score fusion of
many single feature based system as the primary system [4,
6]. This clearly shows that different features are required to
detect different spoofing conditions. Instead of the conven-
tional score fusion approach, a decision-level feature switch-
ing (DLFS) approach proposed in [8] is used here. For a
given trial, DLFS essentially chooses the decision score from
a set of individual features, that has maximum discrimination
between the bonafide and the spoofed model. In this work,
DLFS is implemented with four best performing individual
feature based system for both GMM and TD-SNN frame-
works. The list of systems developed for this work is listed
in Table 2. Features used in primary and contrastive DLFS
systems vary for logical access and physical access. Table 3
shows the results of the GMM-based SDS systems submitted
to the challenge.
Table 3: Performance (in min-t-DCF) of various GMM-based
SDS submitted to ASV-spoof-2019 challenge
System
Type
Attack
Type
System
Name Feature Dev Data Eval Data
Single LA G-LFBE LFBE 0.0077 0.2059
PA G-IMFCC IMFCC 0.1396 0.1518
Primary LA G-Prim CQCC|LFBE 0.0002 0.1333
PA G-Prim
CQCC|IMFCC
|LFBE 0.1236 0.1330
Contrastive-1 LA G-C1 IMFCC|LFBE 0.0003 0.1565
PA G-C1 CQCC|LFCC 0.1226 0.1401
Contrastive-2 LA G-C2 CQCC|LFCC 0.0013 0.2139
PA G-C2 CQCC|LFBE 0.1821 0.1672
The symbol ‘|‘ represents exclusive-OR. A|B implies that either feature A (OR) B will be chosen for each trial.
7. RESULT ANALYSIS
The TD-SNN for LA and PA spoof detection is trained only
on the corresponding training subsets. To avoid the problem
of over-fitting, twenty percentage of training data is used as
Table 4: Performance of various spoof detection systems. Systems with best performance in each category are highlighted in
grey color.
System
Type
System
Name
Logical access Physical access
Feature Development Data Evaluation Data Development Data Evaluation Data Feature
min-t-DCF EER min-t-DCF EER min-t-DCF EER min-t-DCF EER
Si
ng
le
G-CQCC CQCC 0.0123 0.43 0.2366 9.57 0.1953 9.87 0.2454 11.04 CQCC
x-CQCC 0.0164 0.54 0.154 6.93 0.3039 12.98 0.3148 11.83
G-LFCC LFCC 0.0663 2.71 0.2116 8.09 0.2555 11.96 0.3017 13.54 LFCC
x-LFCC 0.0062 0.28 0.164 6.29 0.1231 4.53 0.1314 4.79
G-IMFCC† IMFCC 0.0012 0.04 0.2401 10.62 0.2078 9.19 0.3085 12.10 IMFCC
x-IMFCC 0.0285 1.08 0.4020 18.95 0.1396 5.28 0.1518 5.58
G-LFBE∗ LFBE 0.0077 0.32 0.2059 10.65 0.2581 11.47 0.3708 15.79 LFBE
x-LFBE 0.0561 1.88 0.265 11.12 0.1818 7.39 0.1766 6.99
D
L
FS
G-Prim∗† CQCC | LFBE 0.0002 0.01 0.1333 6.14 0.1888 8.17 0.2767 11.28 CQCC | IMFCC | LFBE
x-Prim 0.0139 0.47 0.175 8.52 0.1236 4.85 0.133 4.91
G-C1∗† IMFCC | LFBE 0.0003 0.04 0.1565 6.46 0.1972 7.53 0.2309 9.33 CQCC | LFCC
x-C1 0.0040 0.16 0.296 14.52 0.1226 4.56 0.140 5.05
G-C2∗† CQCC | LFCC 0.0013 0.04 0.2139 9.04 0.2329 8.48 0.3058 11.34 CQCC | LFBE
x-C2 0.0142 0.47 0.107 5.75 0.1821 7.54 0.167 6.46
G-DLFS1 CQCC| IMFCC | LFCC 0.0026 0.19 0.2070 8.92 0.1548 7.61 0.2260 9.99 CQCC | IMFCC | LFCC
x-DLFS1 0.0033 0.14 0.142 7.50 0.1171 4.13 0.130 5.61
G-DLFS2 LFCC| IMFCC | LFBE 0.0035 0.15 0.1780 7.92 0.3209 10.61 0.2838 13.23 LFCC | IMFCC | LFBE
x-DLFS2 0.0166 0.31 0.208 11.21 0.1230 4.43 0.124 4.42
Systems marked with ∗ and † were submitted to ASV-spoof-2019 challenge under LA and PA conditions respectively. The symbol ‘|‘ represents exclusive-OR. A|B implies that either feature A (OR) B will be chosen for each trial.
the validation subset. This TD-SNN is used to test trials from
development and evaluation subset. The performance of all
SDS on the development and evaluation data are listed in Ta-
ble 4. The best performing system is chosen based on the
min-t-DCF metric [9,10]. G-CQCC and G-LFCC are the sin-
gle feature based baseline systems provided along with the
challenge dataset. Results reported in Table 4 shows that the
performance of the proposed system over the baseline GMM
systems under LA category is not consistent across various
features. On the other hand, the TD-SNN systems consis-
tently give good performance for PA than the GMM systems.
One possible reason could be that, unlike LA, the PA cate-
gory have enough amount of data (refer Table 1) to train the
neural network. Since TD-SNN SDS performs well for all
the cases, we can conclude it as a more suitable classifier for
detecting physical access spoofing. The performance of the
SDS is further improved by applying DLFS as shown in the
Table 4.
Apart from the systems submitted to the challenge, DLFS
with new feature combinations are reported in the table as G-
DLFS and x-DLFS. The comparison of best performing TD-
SNN system is compared with the corresponding GMM sys-
tem with same feature combination and the best performing
GMM system in Table 5. From the result analysis of both
LA and PA, we can conclude that TD-SNN framework can
be a potential model to detect all types of spoofing attacks. It
also justifies our assumption that TD-SNN better identifies the
traces of spoof mechanism in the spoofed utterances than the
GMM. Moreover, since x-vector is the current state-of-the-art
for ASV, a spoof detection system with a similar framework,
will help us to make a common NN framework for spoof de-
Table 5: Relative improvement of t-DCF: Logical Access and
Physical Access (evaluation data)
System
Type
Attack
Type
System
Name t-DCF R.I (in %)
DLFS
Systems
LA
G-C2 vs
x-C2
0.2139 vs
0.1070 49.97
PA
G-DLFS2 vs
x-DLFS2
0.2383 vs
0.1240 47.96
Best Baseline
System vs Best
Proposed System
LA
G-LFBE vs
x-C2
0.2059 vs
0.1070 48.03
PA
G-CQCC vs
x-DLFS2
0.2454 vs
0.1240 49.47
tection as well as speaker recognition.
8. CONCLUSION
Spoofed utterances contain traces of approaches used to gen-
erate them. The ability of x-vector based NN to capture the ut-
terance level information is established in the field of speaker
verification. Hence, in this work, an attempt has been made
to develop spoof detection systems using a similar TDNN
framework. A time-delay shallow neural network (TD-SNN)
with focal-loss function is proposed as the neural network ar-
chitecture for spoof detection. On ASV-spoof-2019 dataset,
the proposed TD-SNN based SDS outperforms all the GMM
based SDS in case of PA, whereas GMM based SDS performs
well for LA in some of the cases. Further, DLFS paradigm
is used to improve the performance of single feature based
SDS. The best performing TD-SNN SDS with DLFS outper-
forms the best performing GMM-DLFS SDS with a relative
improvement of 48.03% and 49.47% for LA and PA in terms
of min-t-DCF, respectively.
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